The speed with which concepts are moved to market is a fundamental issue facing new ventures and their parent corporate sponsors. The questions that emerge are clear. Is a rapid development cycle from concept to market vital for successful corporate ventures? What are the pressures induced by the urgency of product introduction, and how can they lead to poor venture development decisions? Are there circumstances in which a more deliberate pace should be recommended in developing a venture? How may they be recognized beforehand? Conversely, what characteristics of a new venture or product warrant that speed be the driving priority? Is there a process by which one can assess a new technological venture that provides insight into not only the appropriate role of speed in moving a concept to market, but also, the size and timing of R&D investments, and the constitution of the new venture team? In other words, how might one establish reasonable venture development approaches and performance expectations? 1 These questions confront many large corporations that have sought to diversify through both internal ventures and participating in external ones. At the first board meeting of 1989 the Directors of a large materials company, asked the Chairman if in his opinion the results of the company's internal ventures were being brought to market in a sufficiently timely and competitive manner. Soon afterward a small group (including the authors) set out to study a sample of a dozen of the Company's ventures in detail to address the Board's concern. 2 In the process, we learned some interesting lessons about structuring and managing ventures that may be applied to other, large materials based businesses as well.
The Greenhouse
In 1984, the Company initiated the "Greenhouse" as an organization that identifies, screens, funds, and supports the development of new internal ventures until the point that they can be transferred to one of the operating divisions. Since that time, 45 ventures have been funded by the Greenhouse. These ventures range from railroad cars and batteries, to microporous membranes for biotechnology applications. Selected ventures, which pass through a formal screening process involving both technical and 1 The research reported in this paper was an exploratory study of various technical ventures selected by a large company, and is therefore not necessarily a representative sample of all the ventures of that firm. A more rigorously designed field study is presently being pursued by the authors under a grant from the Center for Innovation Studies of Lehigh University. 2 The cases surveyed in this article were investigated and analyzed by Professor Alok Chakrabarti of the New Jersey Institute of Technology, by Professor Michael Cusumano of the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management, and by Professor George Farris of Rutgers University, as well as the authors. We are grateful for their contributions. commercial feasibility studies, are assessed to have a strategic fit with the Company's strengths in core and related technologies.
The Greenhouse strategy may be placed in context of the venturing activities of other large corporations by considering several key areas: Product/Technology Scope:
Venturing efforts must always deal with the issue of what product market areas, as seen in relation to the company's core technologies and markets, should be supported as ventures. Widely diverse new business ventures, outside a company's core business areas, have proven problematic for many corporations. As with most large corporations, the Company has traditionally given product extensions its first attention for new business funding. The next priority in terms of funding lies with the geographic transfer of products. Then comes new product R&D which can use the Company's existing channels of distribution. Last, are new strategic initiatives --substantially different and new types of applications of materials technology which offer long-term commercial promise. It is these projects that have been nurtured within the Greenhouse. While not all of the ventures have been internally generated, all are working on new products that are related to the Company's core technology. Most of the ventures have required substantial product applications development, and often, what may fairly be considered as advances provided through basic research.
Organizational Location:
Companies must also deal with the issue of where new ventures should be situated organizationally, and thus, to whom the venture management should report. There are several traditional alternatives: placing a venture rather early on in its development under an operating division, or keeping the venture with central R&D. The benefit of the first approach is that the venture receives stronger market feedback than if it remained, for example, in Corporate R&D. However, operating divisions often do not have a cultural receptivity towards new ventures. Further, the venture may lose the closeness with central research and development needed for continued product development. On the other hand, the danger with the Corporate R&D alternative is that product development may more likely occur within a market vacuum. Worse, such ventures are often under pressure to validate a particular technology, rather than to develop into a viable business.
The "Greenhouse" concept was designed as an intermediate organizational step between the laboratory and operating divisions, with the purpose of providing new ventures with more time and flexibility to grow from seeds into seedlings before they are finally transplanted fully into operating environments to flourish or to fail. The guiding notion was to bring more specialized new venture management processes to business development, and to provide greater time for more complete product development.
Funding:
The opinions of the key stakeholders in the funding of internal ventures, the venture founders and the senior management of the parent corporation often vary in terms of appropriate funding and time horizons. "Correct" time horizons are clearly dependent on the nature of both the technology in the new product and the state of the target market in terms of customer's appreciation or awareness, and the maturity of distribution channels. Timing is everything. While the allocation of funds to market research and prototype customer interaction are clearly worthwhile, large expenditures in sales and marketing early on for long lead time ventures can be wasteful.
The Greenhouse was designed to achieve appropriate funding through a multi-level approach: one stage for technology development, and a second stage for market penetration with completed products. In a materials based business, the technology development cycle for a new product can produce lengthy lead-times, far longer, for example, than might be required by a software company. In the Greenhouse, the successful technological ventures took between 5 and 7 years to introduce products. Seven years is an average time required to move ideas to market in typical large integrated businesses. 3
Staffing:
The organizational development of successful technological ventures typically demands that qualified persons be involved in the areas of business management and strategy, R&D, and sales. In the context of internal ventures, companies are often faced with whether to recruit these individuals from inside or outside.
The Greenhouse was designed to provide appropriate staffing. In fact, most of the innovative ideas that seed new ventures come from the Company's laboratories, and the Greenhouse attempts to bring these inventors into the new ventures. For business management and sales, experience and customer familiarity are deemed essential, and to get this, the company has sometimes had to look at outside candidates familiar with a market which is new to the company.
Operating within the context of a large integrated business, the Greenhouse strategy has sought to cultivate entrepreneurial attitudes and endeavors, and to assist new ventures in market planning, staffing, and financing. Over the past four years, it has screened over two thousand ideas, about ten percent of which have warranted initial assessment, resulting in "idea-screening" teams, and less than a quarter of these resulted in actual funding. In sum, the Greenhouse was designed to screen and refine new technology ideas, and then to implement those ideas deemed to have high merit.
Venture Strategies and Risk Management
Going back to the issue of rapidly moving concepts to market, we began our study with the idea that while faster may be better, speed also brings with it a series of pressures that, for certain types of technological ventures, can lead to failed venture development if not clearly understood and managed. To address the Board's question, we set out to examine a representative sample of the Company's ventures. All of the cases have grown from the company's own core technologies, or from purchases, licences and jointventures further developed in its laboratories. Fundamentally, any purchased technology is required to be closely related to existing core business or technology strengths. Not all the cases studied are successes or clearly expected to be successes. As one might expect, the ventures studied originated in many different ways: some through internal "spin-offs" from either operating divisions or directly from the company's central R&D organization, others by acquisitions of companies in promising, related technological fields. It is of further interest to note that the cases have been largely examples of "technology-push" situations, where the opportunities seen in new technologies have led the company into new markets outside of its traditional businesses. Examples include energy products, separations, and high performance ceramics. Figure 1 provides a brief description of the ventures that we examined.
One aspect of our study was to classify the ventures on the well known dimensions of technical uncertainty and market familiarity, and then look for key differences in terms of the venture creation and management process. Earlier research in the role of technological and market applications focus in new product strategy has shown that the success of new products is in fact related to the degree of "newness" in technologies and markets. Ventures that seek to pioneer new territory for a company in both areas are highly risky. Furthermore, significant degrees of "market newness" prove more difficult to conquer than technological newness. "Focused" new product efforts succeed better than those entailing wide diversity. 4 Consequently, we believed that assessing the Company's ventures by comparing their diversity to its core businesses, and observing the key implications of these differences, would be a productive approach. Figure 2 shows the ventures grouped according to basic technology and market categories. For the market dimension, three levels of familiarity or newness may be identified by asking:
Existing Markets: Does the venture seek to develop products that target the parent corporation's existing markets in terms of customer groups and product benefits? Normally, such products can be distributed through established channels and take advantage of established market reputation. This can be seen in the second generation of the Company's pipe ventures shown in Figure 2 , where Canadian products were introduced into the United States.
New, But Established Markets:
A venture may also target markets in which the parent does not currently participate, but in which other companies do, and thereby seek to introduce substitutes. While the marketing strategies and distribution channels employed to reach such markets may be new to the parent, there are clear models that may be observed in existing suppliers. Thus, while the challenge is great, there is some degree of certainty in terms of approaches to effective marketing. As shown in Figure 2 , this has occurred with many of the Company's ventures. PUMPS, for example, has sought to create ceramic composites for industrial applications, where it is designing new manufacturing equipment for situations where material wear is a primary consideration. The FILTERS venture initially made laboratory filtration equipment.
New, Emerging Markets:
At the further extreme, a venture may indeed seek to break new ground, and in a sense, "create" new markets for the application of certain technologies. In such cases, competitors are few, market needs loosely defined, and the need for market experimentation high. For example, FILTERS has more recently begun to target novel biomedical applications, such as cell culturing, with its membrane technology.
Similarly, for the technology dimension, we assessed the Company's ventures in terms of R&D difficulty and risk as one of three levels:
Incremental Improvement: Where existing parent technology is incrementally modified to meet new application requirements, a situation where R&D risks are minimized by the fact that both core technology and integration requirements are often fairly dear. For example, RAILCARS was exploiting the Company's expertise in fabrication and welding processes to make its new generation of railroad cars.
Major Enhancement: Where substantial modifications are made in the parent's existing core technologies in order to create the new product. For example, WRAPPER exploited an idea to effectively use unique properties of a wrapping material to redirect microwave energy. This created superior cooking characteristics and differentiated packaging for frozen foods.
Basic Research:
The most challenging and experimental of technological efforts, ventures of this nature must first create new basic core technologies before mastering specific product applications. FILTERS, for example, spent two years in the development of anodized membrane technologies (for which patents were applied and received) before delving into specific laboratory and other biomedical separations applications. The next step was to see what these differences meant in terms of new venture management at the Company. We discovered a number of common characteristics and patterns among the ventures.
Managing Technological Ventures
We considered the Company's experiences with the sampled ventures in the context of both the conventional wisdom on managing technological ventures and more recent, popular notions such as "speed". It became clear to us that the continuous effort to manage new ventures effectively within the Company has centered a specific set of key approaches. These approaches are strategies for establishing "speed" objectives, structuring organizational control, resolving market uncertainty, and managing technology and its transfer processes, and the expectations of senior executives.
Setting a Strategy for "Speed" Speed, as a management priority, can be a wonderful strategy. Bringing the products of ventures to market rapidly allows a firm to be experimental, creating an atmosphere which fosters innovation, renewal, and more importantly, new sources of revenue. And, since few ideas will prove to be the seeds for consequential businesses, introducing a product quickly to market is certainly one way to validate market potential.
However, we have observed clearly that shortened business and technology development times place substantial pressures on a venture team which may not be desirable from a business perspective in certain classes of ventures. Market research may perhaps be short-changed. The early testing and quality assurance for new products may be performed perfunctorily. Or, the marketing programs and materials required for truly successful market introduction are not developed fully. All these things can lead to a failed venture. Thus, executives sponsoring technological ventures must recognize that speed can indeed have negative consequences.
The Company, like many corporations, has undertaken a number of new ventures that have entailed large amounts of technological and market uncertainty. What we have learned is that one must be very careful not to pressure a venture team into premature product introduction. Throwing financial resources at the problem may not help either. Reducing the development cycle for ventures in entirely new areas is likely to increase expenditures without a corresponding reduction of basic market and product applications uncertainty. A product can be developed rapidly that no one wants to use, and an otherwise promising venture can be tarnished due to senior management's perception of a "failed" first product, an image problem that can be difficult to overcome.
Thus, effective new product development may not always be the most rapid product development. "Speed" is relative to the capability of the venturing company and to the nature of the venture it is attempting. Using an adaptation of our original framework, Figure 3 shows a contingent approach to "speed setting". Specifically, new ventures in the lower left quadrants (small improvement-familiar market) can legitimately be required to move into the market quickly and to meet financial targets. Both dimensions of product technologies and user needs are well known, and hence, speed and effectiveness are compatible objectives, and aligning them yields success.
Ventures in the center regions of Figure 3 (new applications of a firm's core technology in markets which though unfamiliar are simply substitutes for other products or materials) require careful and systematic product and market development, with much attention placed on prototype development, testing and evaluation. Parallel prototype development, while increasing expense, has the potential to shorten cycle times and accelerate market penetration. In these types of ventures, effectiveness may not be equivalent to speed, and thus, speed not necessarily conducive to success.
Lastly, ventures in the upper right quadrant (novel technologies for unfamiliar markets and latent markets) require a great degree of experimentation and learning to reduce uncertainty. Development should proceed slowly, perhaps sequentially, and expenditures should be kept relatively low. One should seek confirmation of values to users in a variety of market segments.
This framework also has obvious implications for a company's financial objectives and performance milestones. For example, the Company has also learned to adjust its expectations of new ventures based on the degree of technological and market uncertainty. Small improvements in products pointed at familiar markets, such as the introduction of drain waste and vent (DWV) pipe in the United States and Canada have proceeded quickly. Successive stages of funding can be compared to firm, short-term financial measures. As soon as the Company attacks a market that is new relative to its own experience, typically with a substitute, short-term performance objectives are more difficult to use as the basis for justifying additional investments. Attempts to enter new markets with novel technology have been the most difficult, requiring careful development of both technology and market knowledge. Such ventures have typically entailed joint R&D and marketing activities with other companies. In this case, funding is for exploratory R&D and market prototyping, and thus, substantially different than full-scale business development funding. Spending large sums on highly diverse ventures should be avoided until market and technological uncertainties show clear signs of resolution. For the ventures described in this article, the average time from startup to realized or expected profitability is approximately six years.
Organizational Control
We have also found that different ventures require different organizational approaches to achieve success. Less risky ventures require close ties to operating divisions, energetic use of existing marketing resources and channels, and numerous ties to customers. Ventures with moderate degrees of risk require full-scale detailed market studies which identify more specifically customer needs and distribution methods, as well as energetic research and development to provide new things to markets you know well. In those instances where levels of uncertainty are high, full scale planning and business development may in fact prove counterproductive. Rather, an executive might want to encourage the venture to develop close ties with a few key customers with whom technological applications can be explored. These relationships must be of sufficient confidence and openness, perhaps through a joint venture, that the venture's customers are willing to evaluate sequential prototypes and candidly identify flaws and needed directions for improvement.
For what types of ventures is the Company's Greenhouse organization best suited? A possible answer is shown in Figure 3 . Ventures approaching familiar market applications with existing company technology are best structured as "in-line" efforts, controlled by existing business divisions. On the other hand, ventures seeking to pioneer new technology solutions for markets new to the corporation should continue to build their experimental prototypes under the umbrella of Corporate R&D until such a point where the understanding of user needs and basic technical solutions have solidified. For ventures lying between these two ends of the spectrum, ventures with technical solutions but still needing substantial time and resources to complete product applications, develop marketing programs, and create manufacturing capability, it might be argued that neither the operating line nor R&D are appropriate, but rather, a bridge organization that sponsors ventures in their migration from R&D to line units. This is the appropriate role of the Company's Greenhouse. Roberts and Berry 5 showed that approaches to organizing and growing ventures should be selected according to market and technical familiarity. The development of projects with high levels of market and technical familiarity should proceed within existing business units. Those projects that entail new, but familiar markets and technologies should be approached through internal ventures, acquisitions, and/or licensing. Projects with the highest levels of unfamiliarity are candidates for less directly managed venture capital or venture nurturing arrangements. Our findings are resonant with theirs.
Corporate ventures are dramatically different from independent start ups. They enjoy both the constraint and the benefit of building on a larger corporation's core technology. Through ventures the effectiveness of R&D in the larger context may be enhanced, but this should not lead to the misconception that speeding projects through R&D automatically means that time from concept to market will be less or chances of commercial success greater. By the same token, producing a prototype by no means implies formal product introduction, particularly in unfamiliar markets.
On a related issue, executives are often concerned about where to find the best personnel to staff new ventures. It is generally understood that corporate ventures can be significantly different from independent start up ventures in terms of organization, culture and politics. There is a natural presumption that corporate ventures will recruit internally from the parent corporation. Our study of the Company experience is that while internal recruitment often works well for product development, it can lead to serious problems in the venture's marketing activities. Commodity markets are dramatically different from niche markets, and especially from seemingly large and rapidly growing markets such as ceramics or biotechnology, which are in reality collections of large numbers of highly demanding niches. Depending on the unfamiliarity and newness of a market a corporate venture may have no other choice than to work with another firm, perhaps a new independent venture, or to create a joint venture.
Resolving Market Uncertainty:
Understanding the requirements of unfamiliar markets has been the greatest challenge facing the Company's ventures. Clearly, if a company has no business experience in a target market, it needs to implement specific strategies for validating market acceptability of a new product concept. One needs to determine if fundamental mistakes are being made early on in product development. Thereafter, constant market feedback is required. In a new company, more traditional, structured methods and channels for gathering market information and customer inputs for product development are at best tentative. The market feedback is obtained only after first products are introduced.
While companies are comfortable with the notion of technological prototyping, it is most often not taken to its logical conclusion: market prototyping. Functional feasibility, provable in the laboratories, is but a prerequisite for validating market suitability. Market prototyping, on the other hand, places an emphasis of getting test products into customers' hands as soon as possible, and then adjusting design based on their feedback. For example, in the RAILCARS venture, while prototypes of the new railroad cars were developed within several years of startup, it took five additional years of operating these new cars on live tracks to provide the reliability and maintenance data required to convince customers of the new product's merit. However, persistence paid off with today's substantial level of sales. Similarly, in PUMPS, the new composites developed by the venture must first be prototyped and tested in a wide range of industrial pump components in order to realize customer sales. It took over three years of wear-testing experience for PUMPS to have the evidence that its new pump products were clearly superior.
As one might expect, ventures entailing the application of existing Company technologies have seen products developed quickly by technical personnel. The piping ventures, for example, where completed rapidly by the Company's engineers. When one of the Company's core technologies has been aimed as a substitute for another company's material, the Company has also done well by using its own technical resources, but these products have taken more years to complete.
On the other hand, when a venture has entailed the development of technology outside the Company's traditional core technological expertise, external development resources have been necessary to achieve effective R&D results. This can be seen in the case of PUMPS, where a new composite has been developed for industrial pumps. A joint venture was established with another company that had invented a basic new materials technology in ceramics. In such cases, our observations have been that technology transfer between different organizations becomes a primary and often problematic issue. The Company's experience has been that the exchange of individuals between companies, in the form of temporary assignments, is the most effective way to facilitate the transfer of skills and designs.
Managing the Technology and Transfer Processes
Examining technology transfer processes in each of the cases has led us further to question the conventional wisdom that cautions companies against delving into ventures which address unfamiliar markets based on new technology. The critical issue based on the Company's experiences seems not to be the raw level of uncertainty, but rather putting the appropriate management practices into place to resolve uncertainties and matching expectations and time horizons in proportion to those uncertainties.
When uncertainties are low one should clearly put technology development under the responsibility of a commercial or line manager. When uncertainty is greater and a new venture created, technologists should move into the venture, or at the least report functionally to the venture. Such ventures should be moved through a greenhouse or bridging organization. In our opinion, the greater the degree of newness, the more important this is. Even more uncertain cases should be kept within research and explored until clearer promise justifies greater levels of expenditure and movement into a venture.
If organizational and transfer mechanisms are not well designed then pressure for speed to market clearly becomes a detriment. The Company's experience indicates that effort should be devoted to properly and thoughtfully organizing first, and only then pressing to move more quickly. Preparation and care must be taken in advance if one is to succeed with new ventures. The failure of SHELTER in North America, after considerable success in Europe and the Middle East, for example, was probably due to an attempt to transfer technology contractually rather than forming close working relationships and exchanging people. On the other hand key people stayed with the RAILCARS venture and were constantly available, giving it a greater chance of weathering substantial delays and early disappointments. Key people also stayed with PUMPS through many difficulties in prototype production and testing, and this seems to have contributed importantly to prospects for success. Looking at yet another pattern, BATTERIES seems a case of a highly uncertain venture which was made too distant and too independent early on. It has now been integrated more dosely with the Company's research efforts, and more frequent movements of people are ocurring with encouraging results. In summary, the most powerful means of moving technology is by moving people. The greater the technological challenge of a new product concept, the more frequent and intimate the contact provided between sources of technology inside the company or from a venture partner must be for success.
Setting Expectations and The Role of Top Management
The final overwhelming message of the Company's experience with internal ventures is that successful ventures require a large measure of lasting commitment and persistence. The more risky and potentially rewarding a venture may be, the more necessary it is that top management be patient and allow sufficient time to pass before the question of payoff should even be raised. For example, RAILCARS, now seen as an important success, could easily have been cancelled if evaluated during the long and frustrating period required for prototype testing. By the same token a larger firm shouldn't attempt a venture unless it is willing to commit a part of its resources to the same degree of discounting of present returns for chances at longer term wealth and growth that independent ventures exhibit. Commitment must therefore be defined broadly, ie. to be experimental, to create and sustain valuable businesses, and not be limited to the rapid introduction of a potentially misdirected new products. Recent successes in Japan indicate that a period of 10 to 15 years may be more appropriate as an horizon for producing important new directions in products and markets than the five year horizons typical in North America.
Commitment to new ventures must therefore be defined broadly, to be experimental, to create and sustain potentially valuable businesses in their infancy. Management's support must extend beyond rapid introductions of product extensions, however valuable these may be, in time as well as technical and market scope.
In summary therefore, we ask the reader to reconsider the concept of "speed" in moving new technical ideas into functional products. No doubt, speed is a hot, fashionable concept. Applied wholesale to any technological venture, however, speed can produce poor decision-making and ill-fated products.
Figure 1 A Description of a Sample of Ventures
Formed in 1985, this is a joint venture to define and commercialize product applications of a joint venture company's proprietary technology for creating ceramic parts that are highly resistant to wear. The partner company's research had actually started in the mid 1970's. Target applications have focused on parts for industrial pumps and 'valves, and initial sales were realized in 1988.
BATTERIES FILTERS

CASTINGS
COATINGS
Having initiated an R&D effort to explore the development of batteries in 1982, the Company formed BATTERIES in 1985 to commercialize a new battery technology, the ultimate objective being to help create battery-powered electric vehicles. By the end of 1986, a few low-ticket consumer products were developed to gain market experience, and in 1987, BATTERIES began working on more powerful batteries for use in more demanding applications such as telephone reserve power.
Incorporated in 1986 with a patent in hand for highly porous filters, this wholly owned subsidiary has developed a series of disposable laboratory products. Future products include biotechnology and manufacturing separations applications. Development work had actually begun three years earlier in Company laboratories in Europe, and the total time from product concept to market was about 5 years.
Based on technology developed at another company, the Company formed CASTINGS in 1986. CASTINGS manufactures metal matrix composites based on a simple and inexpensive casting process which represents a breakthrough in terms of these materials. CASTINGS promotes the use of its material by encouraging foundries and extruders to offer metal matrix components to their customers. The initial application for this material has been as a substitute for components where a premium is placed on stiffness and strength, for example, automotive connecting rods and tennis racket frames.
COATINGS is a proprietary process for applying reflective coatings. The major application for this material was for
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PUMPS highway signs and license plates. The process was developed in the early 1970's. The Company attempted to commercialize the process, but this attempt was abandoned in the mid-seventies, because it was more costly than the standard method of applying reflective finishes by the use of reflective tape.
WRAPPER BRAZING
PIPING
SHELTER
WRAPPER is a packaging system which incorporates metal arrays in plastic packaging. The arrays are designed to modify microwave energy to achieve particular features during microwave reheating of foods such as: even temperature distribution, browning or crisping (if desired), or selective heating of the different foods that comprise a complete dinner. The basic technology was developed by an independent inventor and enhanced by the Company in 1984. A commercial venture was established by the Company in 1985. WRAPPER packaging is now in test marketing in North America, Europe, and Japan.
The Company developed a proprietary brazing process in the early seventies, which represented a major improvement in brazing metal heat exchangers. The Company chose to promote the technology by licensing its use. BRAZING's technology is rapidly becoming the standard method for brazing automotive radiators worldwide, and it is being adopted in many other applications.
The Company developed an unique system for continuously plowing-in metal gas distribution lines in the sixties. While there were considerable economic benefits to this system in comparison with the conventional trenching and laying of pipe, the early installations suffered from corrosion problems. In the early eighties these difficulties were resolved, and the method was widely adopted in Canada. It was then applied to the plowing-in of oil field gathering lines. This technology was successfully introduced in the United States in 1987. In addition a metal drain waste and vent pipe was developed in Canada, and then introduced in the United States in 1985.
An Italian company had been marketing a telecommunications shelter that could protect its contents from the extremes of temperature and humidity without use of air conditioning. 
